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Abstract 
The political failure of China’s first independent regulator in a strategic industry – the State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), 2002-2013 – provides a natural experiment to 
uncover fundamental challenges to a gradualist approach to electricity market formation. 
Taking a political institutional approach, we show that while it was largely predictable that 
the breakup of the monopolistic power industry in 2002 created bureaucratic and corporate 
interests that would undercut the institutional role of SERC, subsequent difficulties in 
reforming electricity pricing, dispatch system, and integrating renewable energy sources 
strongly suggests that a central regulatory body would be necessary to lead a decisive 
transition to a market-based electricity market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
China has become the second largest electric power market in the world, running the 
world’s biggest electricity system that produces around 25% of the world’s electricity and 
more than 7% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. The annual value of electricity sales 
are up to $600 bn and annual new investment is around $137 bn. It is predicted that the 
Chinese power industry will invest over two trillion US dollars in the next 30 years, and that 
the nation’s purchasing of power generation equipment alone will account for some 32% of 
the world’s total.1 Indeed, according to China Electricity Council (CEC) data, China’s total 
installed power capacity had reached 1777 GW (gigawatt) in 2017, following a 10% plus 
annual growth rate since 2008.2 Per capita consumption was low at around 3927 KWh 
(kilowatt hour) in 2014, suggesting a massive expansion of power infrastructure would be 
necessary if China’s consumption is to approach the global average.3 Even with the slowing 
GDP growth, it has been estimated that by 2030 China’s power consumption will range 
between 5830 kWh and 8580 kWh per capita (He et al, 2015).4 
                                                          
1 “Meet and network with China’s Electric Power business,” EP Shanghai 2009, 8-10 July 
2009, Shanghai International Exhibition Centre (INTEX), China. 
<www.ceejay.com.hk/EP%20Shanghai%2009.doc>  
2 Founded in 1988 by the State Council, China Electricity Council (CEC) is a consolidated 
organization of all China’s power enterprises and institutions. “2017 electricity & other 
energy statistics” cited in China Energy Portal. < https://chinaenergyportal.org/en/2017-
electricity-energy-statistics/> 
3 “Electric Power Consumption (kWh per capita),” IEA Statistics in The World Bank Data. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC?locations=CN 
 
4 Gang He, Jiang Lin, and Alexandria Yuan (2015), p. 1. While the upper bound remains in the 
latest projections of the World Energy Outlook - 2017 and the BP Energy Outlook 2017 
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 To counter these enormous expectations and to support the development of China’s 
electricity sector, the government launched a series of reforms at the end of the 1990s and 
early 2000s with a view to creating a more dynamic power market structure and to 
establishing a rational regulatory framework. The first time that China’s electricity industry 
became subject to legislative control was with the passing of the first national electricity law 
in 1995 that guaranteed the development of the electric power industry and pledged to 
safeguard the legal rights and interests of investors, operators and users of electric power.5 
It was a landmark legislation that set the next stage of reforms in 2002 with the creation of 
the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) to establish a coherent bureaucratic 
framework for regulating the power sector. It also led to key regulations to supervise and 
regulate electricity-related issues such as pricing of electricity, and issuing and managing 
electric business permits that were promulgated in 2005 with a view to expand market 
forces. By 2013, however, SERC was folded into the National Energy Administration (NEA) 
that was established five years earlier, taking the fall for a decade of top-down reform 
initiatives that have not produced greater marketization of the power sector or enhanced 
domestic energy security.6 In 2015, industrial policy direction shifted from privatization 
toward electricity price reform, electricity trading mechanism reform, dispatch plan reform, 
reduction of curtailment of renewable energy, and the opening up of distribution and retail 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
edition, the lower bound was exceeded by the end of 2016 when China consumed 5919.8 
TWh of electricity, “Electricity consumption China 2010-2016,” STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/302203/china-electricity-consumption. 
5 Electricity Law of the People's Republic of China (Dec. 28, 1995). 
6 “Reform of energy policymaking less radical than expected,” South China Morning Post, 
March 11, 2013. 
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business to new investors (Liu, 2015). However, the unfinished business of SERC has hung 
over Chinese planners. Leading up the National People’s Congress session in March 2018, 
business media reported Chinese planners’ intention to re-establish a dedicated energy 
ministry to oversee the country’s vast oil, natural gas, coal and power sectors.7 Surprisingly, 
this proposal fell through, leaving the electricity sector in an unsustainable state of reform 
impasse and regulatory uncertainties. 
 We argue that SERC’s decade-long tenure should be understood as a political 
failure, for the agency was unable to wrangle away power from entrenched interests to 
achieve the political superiors’ top priorities of marketization, energy security, and 
ecological protection. However, SERC’s demise confirms China’s need for a ministerial-level 
independent regulator, for the alternatives of a weak agency in NEA and greater market 
domination of the grid and generation companies have displaced Beijing from the driver’s 
seat in steering the reform momentum. As a result, the current path of reform toward a 
more “market” based solution – defined in the State Council Document 9 of 2015 - will likely 
result in disorganised deregulation that will perpetuate chronic supply and demand 
imbalances and hampered China’s transition to renewable sources. 
The article is divided into three sections. The first section critically reviews the 
relevant comparative literature on industrial regulation, underlining China’s complex and 
                                                          
7 Josephine Mason, Benjamin Kang Lim, “Exclusive - China plans to create energy ministry in 
government shake-up: sources,” Reuters, March 8, 2018. 
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-parliament-energy/exclusive-china-plans-to-
create-energy-ministry-in-government-shake-up-sources-idUKKCN1GK17E>; “China Plans 
New Energy Ministry to Replace the National Energy Administration,” Latham & Watkins 
LLP, March 16, 2018. <https://www.globalelr.com/2018/03/china-plans-new-energy-
ministry-to-replace-the-national-energy-administration/> 
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multipolar political landscape of government and corporate players for achieving the 
necessary autonomy of a regulatory state. The second section assesses the evolution of 
China’s electricity sector, following four reform priorities and key developments that have 
come to define long-term challenges to marketization. The third section discusses the 
problematic alignment of industrial interests behind China’s power sector reforms from 
SERC’s establishment to its demise and the subsequent regulatory proxies. The conclusion 
considers the legacy of earlier partial reforms on Beijing’s current push for marketization.8  
 
1. THE EMERGENCE OF A REGULATORY STATE IN CHINA 
The case study of the independent regulator in the power sector focuses on the 
political preconditions for and proper institutional role of the central government in 
expediting market formation the post-socialist planning environment. It reflects on three 
related themes in the interdisciplinary literatures on regulatory capitalism: 1) increasing 
pressures on the state in supporting domestic firms’ global market competitiveness, 
discussed as “new industrial policy” for advanced economies (Rodrik, 2004) and “regulatory 
state” in China (Lin, 2005; Pearson, 2005); 2) “regulatory diffusion” (Levi-Faur, 2005; Jarvis, 
2009, 2010) as states - under advice from international organizations and aiming to attract 
foreign capital - seek to adopt standard policy packages and institutional templates for 
sectoral governance; and 3) an anti-liberal model of “state capitalism” (Buzan  and Lawson, 
2014; McNally, 2012) that seems to converge with the resilience of authoritarian regimes 
                                                          
8 Much of the data that have been used for this study have been collected in numerous 
meetings and interviews with government agencies and private sector participants in 
China’s power sector from 2009 to today. In the absence of explicit references to a source, 
the identity of the source has been omitted by his/her request. 
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since what Samuel Huntington called the “third wave of democratization” in the 1990s. Each 
of these perspectives emphasizes a set of state-market relations that generate specific 
demand for increased regulations, while sharing a general, critical assessment of the 
Chinese central state for not putting in place functional capacities to steer the electricity 
market in a difficult dual transition toward market governance and greater input of 
renewable energy. Taken together the comparative theoretical insights point to the 
necessity of a central regulatory agency in effecting this transition.   
A liberal strand of understanding of the rise of the “regulatory state” in China 
predicts bureaucratic adaptation to the predominance of market transactions with the 
Soviet planning economy falling by the wayside in all but a handful of industries (ADB, 2003; 
Yang, 2004; Pei, 2005). There are intrinsic analytical problems in a zero-sum view of the plan 
and the market, most crucially in understating the complex duality of the Chinese 
government’s roles as a significant owner of newly privatized firms and as the regulator of 
industries. Within this duality, Beijing balances between short-term financial gains and 
market predictability against persistent market distortions and longer-term political and 
social costs of sustaining oligopolistic firms. In the energy and electricity sectors, the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) holds controlling shares 
in the large petrochemical, power generation and grid companies. Hence key measures such 
as electricity price liberalization affects not only corporate profitability but also the fiscal 
stability for various levels of the government and the electricity consumers’ sense of 
economic justice. A regulatory state would presuppose the reconciliation of contending 
institutional interests within the State Council and ministries, which is unfeasible given the 
“fragmented authoritarian” structure that governs policymaking process and bureaucratic 
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exchanges in Beijing (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992). Subnational governments incorporate 
the regulatory demand from Beijing, while coping with their own complex stakeholder roles 
in state-owned enterprises.9 From Beijing’s vantage point, market creation is largely about 
facilitating horizontal integration – i.e. transactions across administrative jurisdictions – 
through the vehicle of restructured SOEs that consolidate transactions in their extant or 
newly allocated protected territories.10 The Chinese power sector suffers extraordinary 
geographical fragmentations of power supply bases, transmissions infrastructure, and 
markets. The large grid and power generation companies have been charged by political 
superiors to manage these intra- and inter-sectoral coordination and collective action 
problems, but continuing market failures would push national regulators to step up their 
lawmaking and institution building efforts (Hira et al, 2004; Rodrik, 2004; Hausmann & 
Rodrik, 2006; Vogel, 1999).  
A relative neglect of comparative regulation theories is the institutional risks in 
creating new regulatory bodies. The institutionalization of new state capacities for 
interventions is in itself a major disruption to the existing power balance, and once created 
regulatory agencies raise a new set of risks and coordination problems for the political 
principals and stakeholders (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).  As subjects of regulation, 
state-controlled energy corporations have exerted a direct influence on the natures of 
competition as their dominating market shares, exclusive networks of upstream and 
                                                          
9 Gillespie and Peerenboom (2009). For accounts of local stakeholders’ resistance to the 
restructuring of the oil and petrochemical industries, see Lin (2009) and Lin and Chen 
(2013). 
10 For surveys and representative case studies of Chinese marketization, see Fei (1998), 
Garnaut et al (2005); Green and He (2005), Kennedy (2005), Lin KC (2008); Lin YM (2001); 
Nolan (2001); Sutherland and Ning (2009); Wang et al (1999). 
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downstream integration, and policy privileges virtually guarantee corporate viability and 
significant rent from oligopolistic collusion. Therefore, regulatory efforts produce frequent 
collusions and constant renegotiation of market rules and reform implementation between 
the industry and government agencies (Andrew-Speed and Dow, 2000). 
Industrial restructuring points to a central dilemma of the Chinese party-state’s self-
preservation. Even as the central bureaucratic elite attempts to build state capacities to 
implement sustainable market reform, it cannot prevent sub-national state agents – i.e. 
regulators, local officials, state-appointed managers – from acting strategically for short-run 
gains at the expense of the overall design. Several of the reform measures we examine in 
the Chinese power sector would seem half-baked, tentative, or broken up in sequence, not 
because the reformers do not know what they were doing but that they deliberately 
refrained from a coherent and complete sequence of changes that might produce a 
dangerous backlash that combines fiscal, economic, and social disruptions. Our analysis 
focuses on the SERC that was created in 2002 as a supra-ministerial agency with a mandate 
stipulating a wide-ranging authority over power generation, transmission and distribution. 
SERC was the first non-financial, independent regulatory body in the post-command 
economic administration, and ended on a whimper in 2013 with its functions reassigned to 
NEA – a unit of the NDRC. A systematic understanding of its political and institutional 
context of its decade long existence helps us to anticipate the form and effectiveness of the 
new regulatory models that have also been considered for other sectors and policy areas in 
China.  
 
2. FROM BREAKING UP STATE MONOPOLY TO COORDINATING MARKET OLIGOPOLY 
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Until the 1990s, the development stages of the electricity sector aligned with the 
broader industrial policy undertakings of the Communist party-state. From 1949 to 1985, 
the monopolistic Ministry of Electric Power Industry (MEPI) provided electricity production 
and service as a vertically integrated monopolized utility and also oversaw all functions of 
power generation, transmission and distribution.11 The growth of the sector remained 
negative throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and as China’s economy took off in the 1980s the 
state monopoly struggled to meet the country’s growing electricity demand (Zhang, 2004). 
From 1985 onwards and consistent with the general approach to enterprise and fiscal 
reforms, Beijing pursued decentralized governance with policies providing sector-specific 
finance for local governments to invest in electricity generation and planning authorities 
over electricity utilities and markets (Zhang and Heller, 2004; Wirtshafter, 1990.12 Even as 
the majority of transmission and distribution assets remained in the control of the central 
government, the proportion of state-owned generating assets was reduced to 46% by the 
mid 1990s with the remaining 54%  staying in the hands of local governments and the 
independent power producers (Wong J and Wong CK, 1998). With an overall capacity of 
236.54 GW, a nation-wide generation surplus was achieved by 1996 that ranked China 
second in terms of the installed electricity generating capacity and output in the world. 
Starting in the second half of the 1990s and through the first decade of the 2000s, central 
                                                          
11 The MEPI was rebranded on a number of occasions - Ministry of Fuel Industries (1949-55); 
Ministry of Electric Power Industry (1955-58; 1979-92); Ministry of Water Resources and 
Electric Power (1958-79). 
12 The principal of “Who is Generating Power Should Benefit from” is stated in the State 
Council Regulation No. 72, Provisional Regulation on Encouraging Fund Raising for Electric 
Power and Multiple Rates of Power Tariff, 1985 
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government struggled to maintain incentives for local capacity expansion while seeking 
regulatory powers to check the worst excesses of local protectionism, government-business 
collusion, highly inefficient capital usage, and behaviors leading to environmental 
degradation. From 2007, Chinese planners promoted renewable energy and pushed for 
electricity market reform as essential to achieving China’s sustainable development goals, 
which gained urgency with the global recession and Chinese economic growth slowdown 
since 2008. SERC played a critical role in cosponsoring many of these reforms with other 
ministries, but constantly operated with its hands tied against the entrenched corporate and 
bureaucratic interests. This section assesses the gap between SERC’s formal mandate and its 
operational autonomy and authority.   
 
2.1 Long-term objectives of institutional reform 
 
The institutional reform of China’s power sector revolves around four core policy challenges 
requiring complex coordination between the domestic market, industrial players, and 
bureaucracies at central and local levels: 
1) Electricity supply security in line with China’s growing energy demand: Beijing faces 
chronic problems of managing energy usage cycles and the unequal distribution of 
power generation areas and consumption centers across China. The dynamics of the 
alternating shortage and surplus crises are complex are likely amplified by the local 
political distortions that produce boom-and-bust cycles in capital formation and local 
state protectionism and market fragmentation (Walton and Finn, 2005; Zhu and Li 
2003).  
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2) Market creation after the socialist plan: Given the initial absence of functional 
market signals, central state regulator acts to compensate for deficiencies in the 
market, in particular with respect to energy prices and access to energy transmission 
networks. Beijing asks power and grid companies to provide for public goods such as 
upgrading the power grids, stable prices, energy delivery and service standards 
across China’s vast territories, in return for private goods such as and policy aids on 
technological upgrading and priority access to banks and stock markets for the 
capitalization of power companies (Xie, 2009; He, 2003).  
3) Coordination of upstream-downstream interests: Industrial analysts often point out 
conflicts of interests among coal producers, generators, and transmission and 
distribution companies. These businesses have traditionally come under different 
lines of administration, and remained weakly mediated by market forces and deeply 
embedded in local socioeconomic networks. Until quite recently, planners operated 
under the premise that direct competition in regional markets was likely to be 
ineffective, and thus price liberalization would cause unacceptable levels of 
volatility.13 Instead, the State Council has occasionally intervened to promote long-
term supply contracts between coal suppliers and power plants to improve risk 
management and profitability (Ng, 2008). It has also established guidelines for price 
increases and cross-regional differences that attempt to spread the costs of rising 
inputs. These interventions keep Beijing at the center of a Catch-22 dilemma of 
reacting to failures of competition and being blamed for not pushing for 
liberalization. 
                                                          
13
 The restructured petrochemical industry set a precedent for administered prices. Lin (2008). 
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4) Future-proofing and strategic policymaking: under the Hu and Xi administrations, 
Chinese planners have made domestic and international commitments to 
ecologically sustainable development under lower GDP growth rates. As the world’s 
largest greenhouse gas emitter, China has rapidly scaled the technological frontiers 
to become the world’s leading investor in renewables and producer of clean-energy 
products. In the process, industrial policies have become more complex and 
challenging as the main reform objective of “growing out of the plan” (Naughton 
1995) can no longer be singularly defined as separating out governmental and 
managerial spheres in SOEs and expanding the scope of market transactions. 
Successive bureaucratic overhauls and changing policy demands on SOEs reflect 
these economic strategic complexities. We will focus below on the introduction of 
renewable energy generation and dispatch system reform.  
 
These four challenges have been a distinct feature throughout the evolution of China’s 
electricity sector particularly since the mid-1980s. Varying stages of policy changes leading 
up to state-led privatization and liberalization in the 2000s reveal an intricate balancing act 
the government is forced to play in the creation of more competitive market to satisfy the 
power demand of the growing economy. The independent central regulator emerged in this 
context as an agency of policy innovation and interest mediation.  
 
2.2 Between a Rock and a Hard Place: SERC’s precarious institutional standing 
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From 1997 to 2002, the government sought to leverage the monopoly power of State Power 
Corporation (SPC) to overcome the local protectionist tendencies of provincial. Under the 
decentalized approach to power sector development, local governments and the centrally 
controlled grid companies started to exhibit increasing conflict of interest. The grid 
companies, despite the agreed “Transmission and Distribution” principle, often raised 
electricity tariffs for their state-affiliated generating plants all the while compressing the 
ongrid prices and volumes for the provincial plants and other IPPs (Zhang and Heller, 2004). 
These measures markedly undermined the implementation of the “New Plant, New Price” 
policy as well as the planned unification of transmission and distribution. Provincial 
protectionism as an emerging phenomenon also began to lay barriers for the opening of 
transmission and distribution channels to the IPPs from other provinces and regions, for 
example in blocking the uploading of generated capacity from neighboring provinces.  
This horizontal integration approach gave way to further restructuring of SPC by 
separating the power generating business from the grid transmission (State Council, 2002), 
creating five generating companies (Huaneng, Datang, Huadian, Guodian, and State Power 
Investment Company) and two grid companies roughly along geographical lines. The State 
Grid Company (SGC) is responsible for most of northern China, and the China Southern Grid 
Company (CSGC) covers the economically thriving southern provinces.  
At the national ministerial level, the SERC was established in 2003, endowed with 
authorities to manage the state monopoly break-up, oversee industry reforms, and promote 
a competitive market structure of the power sector (State Council, 2002 and 2003). Echoing 
the long-term reform objectives for China’s power sector, the 2002 electricity sector reform 
had multiple goals. It sought to create a fair and competitive power market structure with a 
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wholesale market and independent regulation; to improve efficiency and lower costs; to 
optimize resource allocation and promote development and national grid interconnections; 
and to continue the rural electricity structural reforms (Zhang and Heller, 2004). To achieve 
these goals, the SERC was mandated with wide-ranging statutory powers that, in addition to 
the regulatory function, provided the agency with the authority to stipulate and enforce 
technical standards and propose tariffs and adjustments to government electricity pricing 
authority, and to investigate market violations (State Council, 2003). The mandated powers 
provided the agency with an authoritative statutory platform to oversee the electricity 
sector. Over the course of its decade long existence, SERC proposed several significance 
marketization initiatives in price transparency and liberalization, anti-trust measures, 
experiments in spot markets and information sharing among market players, and expansion 
of renewable energy sources.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 The reformed electricity market structure is depicted in Figure 1. It displays the 
parallel roles of NDRC, SASAC, and other relevant ministries alongside the SERC in 
commanding the sector’s industrial segments from generation to transmission and 
distribution. This new governance structure, put in place in 2008, failed to clearly elevate 
the position of the regulator and instead placed the SERC right back in the midst of 
fragmented bureaucratic politics that demanded compromises and resource exchanges 
among agencies with overlapping jurisdictions.  
In principle, effective regulation follows, or should be determined, by the choice of 
the electricity structure. China’s power sector on the whole deviated from the standard 
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best-practice model where electricity transmission is separated from generation and funded 
by transmission fees. In other words, China had a wholesale price on electricity that 
included both generation and transmission. This pricing decision has directly shaped 
sectoral interests, posing difficulties for marketization and regulation. For the transmission 
companies, namely the newly established State Grid and China Southern Grid Company, 
their only means to grow or be cost-effective has been by trading generated electricity of 
which they take temporary ownership (contrary to the standard ‘unbundled electricity 
market model’) from the State, regional, or provincially owned power generators, or private 
IPPs. If China’s electricity sector were to follow the standard model, a federal regulator 
would regulate the transmission side. In this case, it would be the SERC. The shortcomings in 
the reform sequencing and institutionalization of competitive electricity market structures 
were indicative of higher-level politicized capture among the China’s governing elites. The 
next section delves into the underlying power structures that impede the fulfilment of a 
fully competitive energy market, and explain the intensification of an underlying struggle 
between the informal leverages of local governments and grid and power companies and 
the new regulatory arms of the central government over the course of reform. 
 
3. Political Pitfalls of Centralizing Electricity Market Governance 
 
Ling Chen and Barry Naughton (2017) have described the coevolution of economic and 
political subsystems in China since 1999 as having gone through two phases – from 1998 to 
2012, Beijing put in place a more sustainable set of power arrangements in finance and 
corporate governance, while continuing to offer local officials incentives and latitude for 
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driving high economic growth. With the economy reaching an unprecedented scale exposing 
problems of inefficient capital usage, corruption in officialdom, and environmental 
externalities, Xi Jinping shifted gear to top down initiatives giving central policy-makers “the 
maximum possible freedom of action” to overcome the system inertia against further 
structural changes in the economy. The following analysis of intra-ministerial politics, 
collusive local government and business interests, and the problem of renewable energy 
curtailment demonstrates the political resistance against centralized solution to cumulative 
problems in reforming the power sector. 
 
3.1 Bureaucratic politics within the State Council  
 
To begin with, the precarious institutional standing of the SERC and its inability to flex its 
wide-ranging formal mandates are best explained by the high level of politicization of 
energy policymaking within the State Council. The power sector reforms including the 
institution of the SERC took form during the tenures of Zeng Peiyan (1998-2003) and Ma Kai 
(2003-2008) as the Chairmen of the NDRC.14 Both individuals were strong proponents of the 
power sector reforms and Ma Kai was a particularly strong proponent of the establishment 
                                                          
14 Ma Kai joined the CPC in 1965 and has held various positions in the Central Planning 
function within the Party before becoming the NDRC Chairman in 2003. Zeng Peiyan in turn, 
while an equally long-running career within the Party, has a background as an electrical 
engineer and with Ministerial level appointments at the Ministry of Electronics Industry. He 
has also held financial planning positions within the State Planning Commission before his 
tenure as the NDRC Chairman.   
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of the SERC.15 Their advocacy partly produced the decisive changes in the institutional 
structure in the 2002 reform, but also created the political conditions for the subsequent 
institutional standoffs and the dependence on high-level interventions in the form of a 
supra-ministerial leadership committee to push toward power reforms and mediate 
conflicting interests. Since 2010 that elite political impetus has been formally nested in the 
National Energy Commission (NEC), operating through a bureau (NEA) in the NDRC. Zhang 
Ping, the Chairman of the NDRC from 2008 to 2013, was a critic of decentralization of 
China’s power sector and openly espoused a stronger central government involvement in 
the key substantive and technical areas of energy administration.  
 Despite the ambitious mandate entrusted upon the SERC, uncertainty regarding the 
highest-level political support left the agency in a weak political bargaining position. By 
statute, the SERC should have been an effective regulatory and oversight agency able to 
design, implement, and enforce effective energy policies, including controlling national, 
provincial, and regional transmission fees through its regional subsidiaries. Yet SERC ability 
to conduct regulatory monitoring and enforcement was severely affected by the NDRC’s 
dominant position and powerful levers. Both the Price Bureau and later the NEA within the 
NDRC exerted such influence on the power sector that they typically left the SERC lost in the 
wake of their independent actions. The State Price Bureau with provincial branches under 
the Provincial Development and Reform Commissions (PDRC) is institutionally part of the 
NDRC and historically approves bundled wholesale and retail prices  - a function that has a 
                                                          
15 Interview with the National Energy Administration (NEA), 22 May 2009, and North China 
Electric Power University (NCEPU), 13 January 2010. 
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significant impact on the commercial viability of generating companies in the provinces.16 
The Pricing Bureaus additionally determine the price of coal, the primary input in electricity 
generation. NDRC also approves transmission licenses in the provinces and controls the 
benchmark price for transmission fees across the country.17 In 2003, SERC spearheaded 
pilots in regional electricity markets. When risk-averse generators and consumers 
responded negatively to volatility in spot market prices, NDRC directed its Price Bureau to 
intervene by suspending price bidding and settling on-grid electricity according to 
contractual prices, effectively forcing SERC backed off.18  
SERC had hoped to improve the regional competitive landscape in the power sector 
by proposing anti-trust laws at both provincial and regional levels in order to uproot the 
anti-competitive and collusive business conduct of transmission companies.19 To force the 
grid companies, namely the State Grid and the Southern Power Grid, and their provincial 
and regional subsidiaries to abide by anti-trust laws, the regulator called for the support of 
the NDRC – which demurred citing its primary functions in price-setting and investment 
                                                          
16 Interview with NCEPU, Beijing, 13 January 2010.    
17 Interview with World Bank official, Beijing, 13 January 2010. In practice, the PDRCs decide 
on the price of the transmission for pilot projects, thus providing the provincial governments 
with power to influence regional pricing. 
18 Announcement on Adjustment On-grid Tariffs by the Zhejiang Southeast Electric Power 
Company Limited, 24 June 2004.  
http://www.ukwire.co.uk/Article.aspx?id=200406240700260908A.  For several years after, 
inter-provincial trading was mostly halted, occurring only to implement top-level energy 
strategies. Ho, Wang, Yu (2017), “China’s Power Generation Dispatch,” A Resources for the 
Future Report. <http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-Rpt-ChinaElectricity.pdf> 
19 It has been the ambition of the SERC to achieve significant antitrust responsibilities since 
the establishment of the agency. This was highlighted in the SERC 2007 report on Study of 
Capacity Building of the Electricity Regulatory Agency SERC, P.R. China. 
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approval mechanisms. Notably then, as the heads of the state-owned electricity companies 
were appointed and confirmed at the highest levels of government, namely the NDRC and 
the State Council, the exercise of the SERC’s authority must be politically circumspect.20 
Given this, hopes for constructing provincial and regional electricity market where 
transmission companies abided by competitive market principles and adhere to regulated 
national transmission fees (as per unbundled electricity market model) were quickly dashed.  
The NDRC’s conduct in terms of information sharing also suggested a lack of interest 
in coming to the aid of the new regulator. The NDRC exclusively controlled all electricity 
generation and transmission (including distribution) relevant data at provincial and regional 
levels, which it often refused to share with the SERC, hence leaving the agency with few 
tools to improve transmission-related pricing problems or to design oversight procedures 
for regional governance and accountability mechanisms.21 The NDRC also effectively acted 
as the final arbiter of whether or not a company can do business in the power sector. Most 
crucially, NDRC was in charge of the annual generation quota system that determined the 
output and profitability of most IPPs. NDRC also vetted power purchase agreements (PPA) in 
contractual negotiations between IPP and the grid companies, empowering it to weld 
significant influence over entry of private and foreign investment and exchange relations 
among firms.22 In comparison, SERC’s prerogative to issue licenses for market access 
                                                          
20 Interview with Caijing Magazine, Beijing, 20 May 2009. 
21 Interview with a group of senior researchers at the North China Electric Power University 
(NCEPU), Beijing, 13 January 2010. 
22 Interestingly, problems with PPA had created an increasingly unpredictable and even 
inoperable environment particularly for foreign investors and power companies, leading to 
their declining participation in the first decade of the 2000s. Interview with Electricite de 
France (EDF), Beijing, 14 January 2010. Sun, Guo, and  Zeng  (2012). 
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including safety and standards certifications seemed relatively ineffectual in shaping the 
competitive dynamics of the electricity sector. Upon its creation in 2008, the NEA took the 
lead in power sector planning and promotion of new technologies, and later acquired the 
approval authority over new investments into the sector, further usurping SERC’s 
relevance.23 Generally speaking, throughout SERC’s tenure the NDRC had surrendered none 
of its authority and instead only strengthened its authoritative grip on the power sector.24  
Given the weakness of the SERC and the contentious government-business and 
central-local relations, Chinese leaders sought to add another layer of strategic governance 
of energy-related policies and industries. In 2005, the State Council established a National 
Energy Leading Group to serve as the highest political forum for addressing China’s energy 
security issues, and also to provide a formal, unified governmental interface with the 
emerging corporate interests of the national oil companies.25 In March 2008 the State 
Council’s establishment of the National Energy Administration (NEA) as an agency housed 
within the supra-ministerial NDRC, and two years later the State Council established the 
National Energy Commission (NEC) as a ministerial-level forum cum policy research think 
tank to take rein of strategic policy-making and coordination.26 While praised NEC as a 
“super energy institution” – mainly on the basis of its broad mandates and comprehensive 
range of ministerial stakeholders represented on the commission, rather than any specific 
capacity and influence as an agency – Zha and Yi (2016) acknowledged that “NEC has 
                                                          
23 Interview with State Power Economic Research Institute, Beijing, 20 May 2009.  
24 Zha and Yi (2016), p. 133. 
25 Hafsi & Tian (2005); Lan (2007). 
26 “China Sets up National Energy Commission,” Xinhua News Agency, January 27, 2010. 
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functioned on a crisis-driven basis.”27 In 2013 SERC was folded into NEA, which has 
undertaken the daily work of the NEC. Under the rhetoric of reducing excessive red tape, 
NEA in effect scaled back regulation by cancelling approval processes and acceptance checks 
and delegating to local energy regulatory offices the issuance of business permits for power 
suppliers.28 In any case, NEC and NEA do not amount to a dedicated supra-ministerial body 
on energy policy, which had been absent since the Ministry of Energy was disbanded in 
1993. NEC has been unable to develop bureaucratic leverages independent of the influence 
of the NDRC - this is perhaps best seen in light of the power sector reforms imposed by 
Zhang Ping, the former Chairman of the NDRC, deviating from the ‘independent’ regulator 
model supported by his predecessors.29 Initially led by former SERC head Wu Xinxiong, NEA 
did not advance ambitious power market reforms.30 To start, NEA has less resource and a 
lower bureaucratic rank than SERC, and its multitasking – including international energy 
policy advisory and scientific cooperation – diluted the commitment to domestic regulation 
and reform implementation. It is likely that leading up to its demise in 2012 the SERC had 
                                                          
27 “China-EU Energy Governance: What Lesson to be Drawn?” in Challenges of European 
External Energy Governance with Emerging Powers, edited by Michèle Knodt, Nadine Piefer, 
Routledge 2016, p. 132. 
28 Swedish Agency for Growth Policy Analysis (2014), “China’s National Energy 
Administration - A short overview.” http://www.tillvaxtanalys.se/in-
english/publications/direct-response/direct-response/2014-07-04-chinas-national-energy-
administration-----a-short-overview.html ; Kreab Gavin Anderson (2013) “China’s NEA Gains 
New Regulatory Powers.” http://www.kreab.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/17/2013/07/National-Energy-Administration.pdf.  
29 Interview with NCEPU, Beijing, 13 January 2010. 
30 “Reform of energy policymaking less radical than expected,” South China Morning Post, 
March 11, 2013. 
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failed in its lobbying effort to support a supra-ministerial alliance between NEA and the 
SERC to administer the sector without overbearing oversight by the NDRC.  
 
3.2 Market dominance of power companies 
 
The dismantling of the SPC into five separate power generating companies and the two 
grid companies formed a two-tier market structure inside China’s electricity governance 
system that strongly favoured the incumbent SOEs. The five state-owned power generating 
companies formed roughly half of the electricity market in 2009, while the rest was divided 
among other central government and provincial power generating companies and private 
companies.31 As the NDRC controls the electricity generation price, also known as the 
regional benchmark, the other power generating companies are not in a position to 
seriously compete with the SOEs which have direct access to the NDRC in its non-
transparent price-setting process.32 Furthermore, with their size and national scope of 
business, the SOEs have superior access to the coal supply whose price they can manipulate 
and profit from by selling it to other power generating companies.33 Consequently, 
provincial and private power companies face significant disadvantages in their long-term 
cost of production calculations.   
In short, the current electricity market system in China protects the dominant 
position of the SOEs and prevents the creation of regional or provincial competitive market 
                                                          
31 SERC Annual Report, 2009.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Interview with NCEPU, Beijing, 13 January 2010. 
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structures with a separate monopoly transmission company(ies) and distribution 
monopolies that are ex ante regulated by local regulators according to national guidelines. 
For example, in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, 
the distribution monopolies can be responsible for retail sales. When small scale generators 
are allowed to sell electricity over the local distribution network, the distribution fees, which 
are analogous to transmission fees, are set by the local regulator. In China however, the 
distribution arrangements are more complex and problematic. A lack of clear division 
between transmission and distribution networks across China makes the pricing of 
distribution, and more generally the way the system works, very difficult to comprehend. In 
fact, no explicit distribution charges exist, only a regulated retail tariff to final consumers 
that is controlled by the NDRC.34 The result is that the ill-defined authority lines of control 
over transmission and distribution networks seriously obscures the regulatory boundaries 
between the national, provincial, and regional levels, and inhibits the creation of 
competitive generation market and retail competition.  
 Whether the oligopolistic competition has resulted in net efficiency gains for 
electricity market is debatable and empirically inconclusive, but endemic rent-seeking is 
evidenced by the increased collusion between regional power market operators and the 
SOEs.35 This collusion has been particularly striking as regards both electricity and coal 
pricing. While they do not own or control distribution networks, the provincial power 
companies do own inter-regional transmission systems and generation plants providing 
them with the resources to seek most beneficial power sharing deals with the SOEs. As the 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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SOEs can usually get away with non-compliance with NDRC imposed regulations, their 
collusion with regional governments and power companies is predictable.36 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Since the demise of SERC, state-owned power and grid companies have been able to 
expand their market dominance and influence over reform proposals and outcomes. 
Combining their public mandate in achieving energy security with private interests in rent-
seeking via dominant market positions, these SOEs have exhibited weak inclination to 
innovate beyond minimal compliance with State Council directives, as an organization with 
complex embeddedness in political, financial, industrial and utility-end user networks from 
the socialist legacy, they also show an inertia against relations with new partners including 
SME suppliers and private consumers such as homeowners.37 This conservative dynamic has 
spilled over to the renewable energy sector, as Wei Shen (2017) observed the formation of a 
“policy community” in renewable energy starting in 2005, in which leading wind turbine and 
solar panel manufacturers and state-owned electricity utilities have framed the strategic 
preferences and policy priority in renewable energy by actively offering their expertise and 
negotiating and coordinating with state actors at both central and local levels. For example, 
the State Grid’s enthusiastic promotion of smart meter and grid and ultra-high voltage 
transmission projects has been documented as private interests shaping technology choices, 
leading to criticisms that SGCC’s investment exacts opportunity costs and could be 
                                                          
36 Interview with World Bank official, Beijing, 22 May 2009.  
37 Mah, Wu and Hills (2017). 
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inconsistent with the broader reform design of the planners.38 This “incumbent-led model” 
of “structural changes in socio-technical regimes” enables these firms to devise corporate 
strategies at their own pace, limiting the opportunity for regulators to lead.39 
In face of delays in regulatory development and marketization, a major policy thrust 
in 2017 in the electricity sector was the State Council’s endorsement of mega-mergers 
among the biggest power companies.40 Guodian merged with China’s largest miner 
Shenhua, allowing the former to secure coal supplies while enticing the latter to diversify 
from the fossil fuel business.41 Two former units of the monolithic China Nuclear Industry 
Corporation, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China Nuclear Engineering and 
Construction Corporation (CNEC), combined to form an integrated company competing 
against State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) and China General Nuclear Power Group 
(CGNPC) in building nuclear power plants at home and abroad.42 SPIC is rumoured to be in 
merger talk with Huaneng. The mergers conform to SASAC’s stated goal to reduce the 
number of centrally-owned SOEs, and have been justified on the grounds of possible gains 
                                                          
38 Mah, Wu and Hills (2017) conclude that “higher-order potential benefits” – e.g. the 
extensive use of demand response programmes and high penetration of renewable energy – 
were not realized from the capacity expansion. Also Xu (2018). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Stapczynski S ,  Guo A,  Yang J. (2017),  "China's $1 Trillion Power Industry Overhaul Is Just 
Starting". Bloomberg. August 31, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
08-29/china-s-1-trillion-power-industry-overhaul-is-just-starting 
 
41
 “China Is Creating the World's Largest Power Company”. Bloomberg News, August 28, 2017. < 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-28/china-approves-guodian-shenhua-group-to-merge> 
 
42 “CNNC and CNECC soon to merge,” China Policy, https://policycn.com/policy_ticker/cnnc-
and-cnecc-soon-to-merge/ 
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for wind power and reduction of coal power overcapacity. It is also possible that bigger 
central state firms, operating under greater price liberalization of transactions in recent 
years, could force marketization on smaller players and local governments. The most certain 
benefit is corporate profitability for the SOEs from greater market concentration, reduced 
price war, higher tariffs, and improved asset profile for stock market valuation and overseas 
direct investment. However, one should at least consider the political consequences and 
corporate governance risks of binding together former units of the state monopoly 
(AsianPower, 2017).  
 
3.3 Resolving the Curtailment of Renewable Energy Inputs  
 
The Chinese planners intend wind, solar, and biomass energy to make up 8% of China’s 
power generation capacity by 2020.43 The 2005 Renewable Energy Law provided financial 
incentives for renewable energy power generators and required grid companies to prioritise 
renewables in dispatch via mandatory procurement, which spurred rapid local government 
and private investment in wind and solar capacity building leading to overcapacity outcomes 
the NEA has not been able to manage.44 Renewable energy curtailment has been estimated 
to be around 20% on average nationally over the past five years and reaching around 40% in 
                                                          
43 China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, The New York Times, 30 January, 2010. 
See also, China’s Latest Leap: An update on Renewable policy, Renewable Energy World, 21 
July, 2010.  
<http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/07/renewable-energy-
policy-update-for-china> 
44 Interviews with NCEPU and EDF, Beijing, 14 January, 2010. Also Lam, Branstetter and 
Azevedo (2017). 
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some regions with high renewable energy output (Ho and Nielsen, 2017; Davidson, 2018). In 
partial response, central planners introduced in 2011 a unified national annual plan on wind 
power development has helped address the problem of fragmented authority for project 
approval. In 2016, a unified five-year plan for the whole power sector was jointly issued by 
NDRC and NEA, further aiming to put an end to the fragmented planning in various power 
sources of the previous decade (Qi et al, 2018). Experimental schemes were put in place 
after 2008 to allow some of the power generating companies to sell electricity directly to 
provincial grid companies and to distribute it to end-users without the involvement of the 
state-owned grid companies (Ni, 2006; Martinot and Li, 2010). According to the World Bank, 
a number of such pilot projects exist today and a greater number could eventually provide 
the national regulators with the preconditions for wider scope and oversight authority, and 
hence with the ability to reduce transaction costs in the national electricity market.45 
Studies of curtailment have blamed the grid companies for rejecting renewable inputs 
during periods of low fossil fuel prices and prioritizing fossil fuels in inter-provincial/regional 
transmission contracts.46 As explained above, the root cause of the companies’ resistance 
lies in China’s institutional design of the electricity market, which has set a pattern of 
redistribution of economic rents and political relations motivating entrenched interest 
groups to minimize or deflect the impact of new policy directions.47 The typical proposed 
solutions – e.g. raising carbon prices, implementing national cap-and-trade program, 
creating regional spot market, requiring full purchase of guaranteed RE generation, 
                                                          
45 Interview with World Bank, 13 January 2010. 
46 Karplus, Davidson and Kahrl (2017); Branstetter, and Azevedo (2017). 
47 Karplus, Davidson and Kahrl (2017). 
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introducing a green certificate (REC) system, imposing penalties for unapproved capacity 
expansion48, and reimbursing renewable energy providers and investing in supporting 
transmission infrastructure, etc. – all presuppose that central government takes decisive 
actions in delineating the structure of its electricity market, or is setting up a system for an 
functional and transparent ‘unbundled’ electricity provision mechanism. Given the intrinsic 
political problems, these reform steps are not feasible given the demise of an independent 
central regulator (Zhang, Andrews-Speed, and Li, 2018). As an illustrative example, Davidson 
(2018, p.300) notes that the most successful example of cross-jurisdiction exchange has 
been long-term auctions in parts of North Grid — Beijing, Tianjin, and Northern Hebei – 
which involve government interests closely tied with Beijing, “indicating the likelihood that a 
strong central government role was necessary to make this regional market happen.”  
 
4. CONCLUSION: REGULATORY CAPACITY IN FLUX 
 
As China’s transitional electricity sector finds itself under growing pressure to support the 
country’s fast expanding economy, inflexible, inefficient, and even collusive institutional 
structures continue to hamper the designed power sector reforms (Du et al, 2009; Lin, 
Purra, and Lin 2011; Pollitt et al, 2017). Power struggle between the political elites, inability 
to reign in and adequately control regional and local power markets, collusive behavior even 
between regional administrative agencies in regard to transmission and distribution of 
electricity, and the controlling position of the NDRC all constitute enormous challenges to 
the power sector reformers. The case study of SERC helps to explain why China’s power 
                                                          
48 Interview with Asian Development Bank official, Beijing, 13 January, 2010.  
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sector governing institutions have seen little stability over the past two decades and policy 
norms – which play a significant role in the creation or reform of regulatory modalities in 
other transitional contexts – have yet to take root in China. 
This institutional weakness corresponds to reform impasse in the past five years. 
Beijing initiated its latest round of electricity reform in 2015 with the State Council 
Document 9: “Furthering Reform of the Electricity Market.”49 Given difficulties with state-
owned enterprise reform in general and other economic priorities in under President Xi 
Jinping’s first four years, no breakthrough measures have been implemented.50 The main 
objectives in this round of reform include trying out the principle of “cost plus reasonable 
profit” in transmission and distribution tariff, liberalization of the retail electricity market to 
attract diverse investors and to establish a relatively independent electricity trade center, 
and improving the generation dispatch mechanisms (Kahrl, Dupuy and Wang, 2016). Pilot 
programmes testing these reforms have been in place in select provinces, but have yet to 
reach widespread national implementation. This piecemeal approach, typical in the 
“experimental” approach (Heilmann, 2008) to structural reform in China, creates pockets of 
resistance to policy mandates and variability in policy outcomes such as growing disparities 
in price signals between provinces that run market pilots and those that do not (Kahrl, 
Dupuy and Wang, 2016; Pollitt et al, 2017). Nevertheless, there has been an encouraging 
rise in the amount of electricity sold through so-called direct trading – i.e. market-based 
                                                          
49 “Six documents on power reform to release, pilot reform to expand”, Xinhua Finance, 
August 26, 2015, http://en.xfafinance.com/html/In_depth/2015/134476.shtml 
50 As an indication of the central government’s reticence on reform progress in this sector, 
electricity was mentioned only twice in passing in Premier Li Keqiang’s Report on the Work 
of the Government on March 5, 2017. Li (2017). 
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mechanisms such as direct sales and centralized auctions – which reached 19% of total 
electricity consumption in 2016 and was expected to top 35% in 2017 (Wang, 2017). Until 
2015, power producers had to sell electricity at prices set by the grid companies, resulting in 
higher prices that in recently years had not reflected the supply glut. Chinese industry users 
pay some 50% higher electricity cost than US industries. Recent establishment of some 28 
electricity trading centers across China have allowed power-generating firms to negotiate 
supply contracts directly with end users such as large industrial companies or distributors, 
resulting in significant price drops. The major short-run loser is the State Grid, which 
announced that it lost 56 billion RMB in earnings in the first half of 2017.51  
One might have expected the politics of power sector reform to have reached a 
turning point at the massive bureaucratic streamlining effort in March 2018, underpinned 
by President Xi Jinping’s governance approach of centralized solutions to structural 
problems in the troubled Chinese economy.52 Surprisingly, the energy and power sectors did 
not get a new national regulator.53 Pending further information on the elite policy process, 
one could interpret the shelving of a new energy ministry either positively or critically. 
Instead of re-creating another agency that cannot overcome overlapping ministerial 
                                                          
51 Huang K and Song S (2017) “China’s Power Pricing Reform Burns 56-Billion-Yuan Hole in 
State Grid’s Earnings.” Caixin, June 29, 2017.  https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-06-
29/101107481.html  
52 Shu Zhang, Se Young Lee, “China to merge regulators, create new ministries in biggest 
overhaul in years”, Reuters, March 13, 2018. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-
parliament/china-to-merge-regulators-create-new-ministries-in-biggest-overhaul-in-years-
idUKKCN1GP00D 
53 “Xi shakes up Chinese government to cut bureaucracy, end turf wars”, South China 
Morning Post, March 13, 2018. 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2136939/china-unveils-sweeping-
governmental-changes-cut-bureaucracy-and 
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jurisdictions and disentangle from powerful SOEs and clientelistic politics, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping has allocated his political capital to first reshape the organizational field of the 
State Council, notably in reducing the role of NDRC. NDRC’s oversight function of China’s 
carbon emissions is reassigned to the new Ministry of Ecological Environment, and its price 
supervision, inspection and anti-monopoly roles will be merged into a powerful State 
Administration for Market Regulation.54 One begins to detect a rationalizing logic in Xi’s 
approach to ministerial restructuring, prioritizing effective performance of general tasks 
over sector-specific administration that has been vulnerable to capture.55 In contrast, a 
critical interpretation would question whether the March 2018 bureaucratic reshuffling 
paves the way for deep market reforms, or is yet another means of Xi’s continuing 
consolidation of power by putting his supporters in power and asserting party control over 
state administration.56   
In concluding we recall Andrews-Speed and Dow (2000) who astutely observed a 
decade ago that while the Chinese central government has lost or relinquished its vertical 
command and control, it has yet to take on new responsibilities in supervising or regulating 
horizontal, contractual relationships. Eighteen years later, Zhang, Andrews-Speed, and Li 
(2018) maintain that there remains an urgent need for a strong central government role in 
top-level design and supervision, market creation, and promotion of renewable energy. It 
                                                          
54 “‘Too big and too powerful’: why Xi Jinping is reining in China’s economic planning 
agency”, South China Morning Post, March 14, 2018. 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2137043/too-big-and-too-powerful-
why-xi-jinping-reining-chinas-economic; “The 2018 Two Sessions in Review,” Brunswick 
Group, March 2018. https://www.brunswickgroup.com/media/4124/brunswick-china-
analysis-npc-2018-2018-03-22.pdf 
55 Lin (2007); Chen and Naughton (2017). 
56 Interview of a Beijing academic knowledgeable of the oil industry, 10 July 2018. 
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seems a matter of time before Beijing will support the re-establishment of a central 
regulatory body that could go beyond SERC’s limitations.   
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Figure 1. Electricity market structure after 2008 reforms 
*CEC and NEA are independent organizations but under supervision of SERC and NDRC.  
Source: LKY School of Public Policy research 2011 (National University of Singapore).  
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Highlights, “Transforming China’s Electricity Sector” 
 
K-C. Lin and M. Purra 
 
 China’s State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) failed for political 
reasons  
 Marketization runs counter to the interests of utilities companies and 
provincial governments  
 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)’s market 
levers are weakening 
 Current structure of China’s electricity market leads to high renewable 
curtailment 
 A centralized energy ministry is needed to achieve energy security and 
sustainable development 
 
*Highlights
